Security boundary

Luvion can protect only operations that are technically required to pass through its authorization path.

Mandatory enforcement

For a declared critical operation, the protected authority must be migrated or bound to a Luvion-aware execution point. Examples include a protocol administration module, Safe module, timelock executor, bridge administration layer, mint/burn controller, custody operation endpoint, or equivalent wrapper.

The execution point must verify that the authorization certificate:

• is valid under the active authorization public key and key epoch;
• binds the exact operation being executed;
• uses the required policy and participant set;
• is within its validity and replay boundaries; and
• has not already been consumed or reconciled.

Bypass paths

An operation is not protected by Luvion if a legacy administrator key, direct contract owner, multisig owner, emergency administrator, or other execution path can perform that operation without a valid Luvion authorization.

Bypass paths must therefore be removed, migrated, or explicitly documented as outside the protection boundary.

Threats the design addresses

The target architecture is designed to reduce:

• compromise or coercion of a small signer group;
• approval of an operation with altered target or parameters;
• replay across requests, policies, chains, or key epochs;
• coordinator equivocation and conflicting session transcripts;
• duplicate or ambiguous execution after retries or crashes; and
• deletion or rollback of local terminal evidence.

Threats outside the cryptographic layer

Threshold authorization does not by itself solve candidate-pool Sybil risk, operator correlation, unsafe adapter code, compromised governance, incorrect external risk data, endpoint vulnerabilities, or legal and operational failures. Production deployments require independent operators, secure key providers, reviewed adapters, monitoring, incident response, audit, and explicit governance rules.